
Cipta Aksara Literasi Media

Law in Governance and Human Rights Today

Vol. 1 No. 1 (2027)
pp. 1-9
ISSN: in process



MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW – not yet published, not indexed, subject to change.

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Implementing a Regency Regulation on Fire Services: Prevention, Suppression, Rescue and Evacuation under Magelang Regent Regulation No 25 of 2025

Wimanda Aby Fatturochman[1]*

[1] Faculty of Law, Universitas Muhammadiyah Magelang, Magelang, Indonesia

ARTICLE HISTORY

Status: Manuscript in review

© The Author(s). Manuscript under review at Cipta Aksara Literasi Media; not yet published.

ABSTRACT

Fire protection is a basic public service that Indonesian local governments must provide, and its organisation often changes with regional government reform. Magelang Regent Regulation No 25 of 2025 turned the fire service of Magelang Regency from a technical implementing unit (UPT) into a Fire Protection and Rescue Division of the Civil Service Police and Fire Protection Unit, led at a higher grade and with two sections. This article asks how the Regulation is implemented in the prevention, suppression, rescue and evacuation of fires, and which factors support or hinder implementation. It uses empirical legal research with a statute approach and an empirical approach. The primary data are interviews with the head of the division and a platoon commander, with observation and documents, and the data are analysed with George C. Edwards III's four variables of policy implementation: communication, resources, disposition and bureaucratic structure. The article finds that the institutional change clarified tasks, powers and lines of command, that communication and staff commitment are strong and that the service has standard operating procedures. Resources are the weak point: budget efficiency measures in 2026 limited purchases and training, the service has 11 fire engines against a stated need of 18, protective equipment is short and only a few staff have advanced training. Official activity data show that fires are under 5 per cent of what the service does, which suggests that rescue, evacuation and prevention should be budgeted as its main work. The evidence is two interviews and internal data, so the positive assessment should be read with care.

Keywords: fire protection; regional government; policy implementation; public service; Magelang

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

This manuscript is under review. It is not yet published or indexed, it may change before publication, and it should not be cited.

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

1. Introduction

Indonesia is a state based on law, and Article 1(3) of the 1945 Constitution makes every act of government depend on lawful authority exercised in line with legislation. The Government is also charged with achieving the aims of the State set out in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble, which include protecting the people and advancing the general welfare, and this is done through public services provided under authority conferred by law. In administrative law, authority is the basis on which the government may act, and it gives certainty and protection to the public.[1] Law No 30 of 2014 on Government Administration requires that government be run on lawful authority and the general principles of good governance.

Government is run not only by the central government but also by regional governments through decentralisation. Law No 23 of 2014 on Regional Government gives regions authority to regulate and manage government affairs, including public services as a way to protect the public. Services therefore need a legal basis and must also be delivered effectively.[2] Fire protection is one such local service, under Law No 25 of 2009 on Public Services and the minimum service standards in Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 114 of 2018 on the technical standards of basic services in the fire sub-affair.

In Magelang Regency the service is organised by Regent Regulation No 25 of 2025 on the Position, Organisational Structure, Duties and Functions, and Working Procedures of the Civil Service Police and Fire Protection Unit (*Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja dan Penanggulangan Kebakaran*, Satpol PP dan PK). It replaces Regent Regulation No 60 of 2021 and follows Regency Regulation No 6 of 2024, which amended the regional bodies' establishment rules. The change is more than an adjustment: it moves the fire service from a technical implementing unit (*Unit Pelaksana Teknis*, UPT) to a division, and it widens the tasks from fire fighting to prevention, public education, suppression, rescue and evacuation. A study of whether the change works is needed to know whether the new structure, division of tasks and broader functions are carried out in practice.

The need for fast action is clear from the record. The regency recorded 126 fires in 2025 in its districts, with the most in Grabag (21), then Mertoyudan (13) and Tempuran and Mungkid (12 each). The commonest cause was an electrical short circuit (47 incidents), followed by the use of wood stoves.[3] Earlier studies looked at Regent Regulation 60/2021, at the qualifications of fire officers under a ministerial regulation, and at service quality in Surabaya, Makassar and Tangerang.[4] None examined Regulation 25/2025, which came into force only recently. This article asks two questions: how the fire service of Magelang carries out prevention, suppression, rescue and evacuation under the Regulation, and which factors support or hinder it.

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

[1]Maryam NS (2016) and Ridwan HR, as cited in the thesis.

[2]Hermansyah, Ismail and Lina SR, 'Penerapan Otonomi Daerah Pada Sektor Pelayanan dan Prinsip Good Governance (Studi Pada Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu Di Kota Bekasi)' (2023) 6(1) 106.

[3]Data of Satpol PP dan PK Kabupaten Magelang, as reported in the thesis.

[4]Septiantoro G and others, 'Implementasi Peraturan Bupati Magelang Nomor 60 Tahun 2021 tentang Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja dan Penanggulangan Kebakaran' (2024); Khamami T, 'Implementasi Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Nomor 16 Tahun 2009 tentang Standar Kualifikasi Aparatur Pemadam Kebakaran di Daerah' (2023); Hia FP, Suherman A and Firdiyani F, 'Responsivitas Pelayanan Pemadam Kebakaran Unit Pelaksana Teknis di Kecamatan Batuceper Kota Tangerang' (2025) 12(2) 561.

2. Method

The study is empirical legal research. It looks at the legal rules and at how they work in practice, through the conduct of the officials who apply them.[5] It combines a statute approach, which examines Regent Regulation 25/2025 and the legislation behind it, with an empirical approach, which looks at how the Regulation is applied in the duties of the fire service. The object is the work of the Fire Protection and Rescue Division under the Regulation.

The primary data come from interviews with two people: the Head of the Fire Protection Division, and a Platoon Commander of the fire service, who is an operational officer in the field. They are cited by post. The author also made observations of the service's readiness, equipment and activities, and collected documents such as regulations, incident reports, service data, budgets and personnel and equipment lists. The secondary data are legislation, books, journal articles and earlier theses. The data were analysed qualitatively by data reduction, display and conclusion drawing in the Miles, Huberman and Saldaña model, and the findings are organised by the four variables of George C. Edwards III's theory of policy implementation: communication (transmission, clarity, consistency), resources (staff, budget, equipment, authority), disposition (commitment and attitude of implementers) and bureaucratic structure (procedures and division of tasks).[6]

The method has clear limits. The interviews are with two officers of the unit under study, one of them its head, so the answers describe how the unit sees itself, and no one outside it (members of the public, other local agencies, the council) was asked. The documents were supplied by the unit. The study therefore tests consistency between the Regulation and what the unit reports, and it cannot show how the service is seen from outside.

3. The Institutional Setting

3.1 The legal basis and the change from UPT to division

Under Law 23/2014, public order, community protection and fire protection are mandatory local affairs, divided into sub-affairs. The Satpol PP dan PK handles three of them: public order, fire, and community protection. Government Regulation No 18 of 2016 on Regional Bodies allows a regency to combine several affairs in one body according to workload, financial capacity and effectiveness, and Regency Regulation 19/2016, as amended by Regency Regulation 6/2024, created a body called the Civil Service Police and Fire Protection Unit.

The fire service has changed form several times. It began as a technical unit under a regent regulation of 2009, later amended in 2011, and sat under the public works agency. Regent Regulation 49/2016 combined it with the Civil Service Police, and Regent Regulation 60/2021 updated the arrangement. Regent Regulation 25/2025 replaced the 2021 Regulation and created the Fire Protection and Rescue Division with a Section for Prevention and Public Education and a Section for Suppression, Rescue and Evacuation. The thesis also notes a national direction in Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 16 of 2020 that fire and rescue affairs be housed in an independent agency, which has prompted calls for the fire service to be separated from the Civil Service Police; the regency's regional secretariat continues to review this.

[5]Soekanto S and Mamudji S, *Penelitian Hukum Normatif* (2015).
[6]Edwards GC III, as cited in Mansur (2021) and Pramono (2020), in the thesis.

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

Table 1 sets the two regent regulations side by side, following the thesis's comparison.

Table 1. Regent Regulation 60/2021 and Regent Regulation 25/2025 compared. Source: the thesis author's analysis of the two regulations.

Aspect	Regulation 60/2021	Regulation 25/2025
Reason	Bureaucratic simplification and Minister of Home Affairs Regulation 90/2019	Adjustment to Regency Regulation 6/2024 and to strengthen the Unit's fire functions
Type of body	Type B agency: one secretariat and at most three divisions	Type A agency: one secretariat and at most four divisions
Fire organisation	Technical Implementing Unit (UPT), head at echelon IV, no sections	Fire Protection and Rescue Division, head at echelon III, two sections
Tasks	General technical and operational tasks, fire fighting and rescue, post readiness, equipment upkeep, internal administration	Programme planning, policy implementation, coordination, monitoring, evaluation and reporting on prevention, suppression, rescue and evacuation, including rescue in other situations that endanger people
Service orientation	Fire response	Information, prevention, suppression, rescue and evacuation across the regency

The thesis lists further effects of moving from a unit to a division. Decisions that a unit head had to send up by internal memo, such as redeploying engines across posts, signing a cooperation agreement with a private firm or buying emergency supplies, can now be taken in the division's own staff meeting. The thesis also says that the Head of the Division acts as a budget-execution official with authority to draw up, propose and carry out the operational budget within the division's ceiling. That statement comes from the interviews and should be checked against the regional finance rules, because the power to use the budget normally lies with the head of the whole body, and a division head ordinarily acts only as a technical activity officer.

3.2 Capacity and workload

The division has 254 staff: 11 civil servants, 63 government employees on work contracts (PPPK) and 180 part-time contract staff (PPPK PW). They work in 24-hour rotating platoons. Service is delivered from one main sector post in Sawitan and nine fire management areas (*Wilayah Manajemen Kebakaran*, WMK) in Grabag, Tegalrejo, Muntilan, Salam, Bandongan, Tempuran, Salaman, Kajoran and Secang. The vehicles are 11 fire engines, 2 water tankers, 1 rescue vehicle and 1 ambulance, 15 in all. In 2025 the thesis counts 252 certificates held (222 by men and 30 by women): 243 for the basic course (Diklat Damkar I), 3 for the advanced course (Diklat Damkar II) and 6 for a medical first responder course.

Official data for 2025 show an average response time of 10.13 minutes. The fastest districts were Salam (7.00), Bandongan (7.29), Salaman (7.29) and Tegalrejo (7.40), and the slowest were Ngablak (20.00),

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

Windusari (17.00) and the southern Magelang support area (18.00); the regency is mountainous, with altitudes from 153 to 3,065 metres, 21 districts and a population of 1,355,045. The thesis states a service target of a response within 15 minutes of the report.

The activity data in Table 2 show what the division actually does.

Table 2. Activities of the fire protection division, Magelang Regency, 2025. Source: monthly figures in the thesis, from Satpol PP dan PK data, totalled by the authors.

Type of activity	Count in 2025	Share of all activities (%)
Fires	123	4.6
Rescue	383	14.4
Evacuation	1,508	56.8
Prevention (public education)	273	10.3
Other	367	13.8
All activities	2,654	100

Fires made up under five per cent of activities, and evacuation made up more than half; the thesis does not say what the categories include, although its interviews mention animal rescue, such as snakes, wasps and animals in wells, among the non-fire tasks. The 123 fires counted from the monthly table differ from the 126 given in the thesis's introduction. The division's workload is therefore mainly non-fire work, which matters for the discussion of budget below.

4. Findings: Implementation under Edwards's Four Variables

4.1 Communication

Transmission, clarity and consistency are the three aspects of communication. On transmission, the Head of the Division said the Regulation was explained to all staff in internal meetings, in a briefing at the morning roll call each day and at every shift change, and in a physical roll call twice a month at the main office led by the head of the Unit. The explanations covered the division of tasks, powers, the lines of coordination and the functions of the new sections. The Platoon Commander confirmed that information and instructions come by group messaging and briefing, and that each morning the platoon reviews the day's work so that shortfalls can be corrected.

On clarity, both officers said staff understood their tasks and powers, because of regular guidance and previous training in the operating procedures. On consistency, communication continued after the start of the new Regulation: through briefings, shift-change reviews, coordination with the disaster management agency (BPBD), the police, the Red Cross (PMI) and hospitals, and regular explanation at the main office and the WMK posts. On Edwards's test the communication variable is therefore met, and it supports implementation. The evidence for this, however, is the unit's own account of its briefings. No staff survey or document check supports the claim that all staff understood the change.

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

4.2 Resources

Staff. The Head of the Division said staff numbers are enough: each WMK has 27 people in three shifts of nine. All staff have completed the basic course, but only three have completed the advanced course, for lack of opportunity and money. The Platoon Commander said a platoon is large enough to run the available vehicles, but that more vehicles would need more people.

Equipment. Vehicles are generally in good condition, but some are old and break down on duty; they are inspected every day before use, but as the fleet is small, some are used continuously and risk overheating. Equipment is adequate in quality but limited in number, so not every WMK is fully equipped, and the number of protective clothing sets (158) does not cover all staff. The division has 11 fire engines. At two engines for each of the nine posts, the ideal is 18, a shortfall of seven.

Budget. The Head of the Division said the operating budget does not fully meet the needs of the service, and that in 2026 a budget efficiency measure forced the division to adjust. It affected equipment purchase, facilities and some operations. Priorities had to be set: in some circumstances staff give priority to the most urgent incident and handle non-fire services, such as wild animal rescue or wasp-nest removal, more selectively. The thesis gives the figures in Table 3.

Table 3. Budget of the fire programme, Magelang Regency (rupiah). Source: figures in the thesis from Satpol PP dan PK data. The percentage for 2026 is the thesis's own and does not match the sums (see text).

Item	Amount
2025: allocation for the programme of prevention, suppression, rescue and non-fire rescue	8,083,940,200
2025: realisation	7,926,174,374 (98.05%)
2025: figure used for comparison in minimum service standard planning	8,100,000,000
2026: allocation	8,083,940,200
2026: realisation (to the date of the thesis)	6,151,319,869 (reported as 95.4%)
2026: training of fire staff	5,000,000
2026: purchase of equipment and protective clothing	175,090,836

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

The figures raise questions. The 2026 realisation of Rp6.15 billion is about 76 per cent of the Rp8.08 billion allocation, not 95.4 per cent, which may reflect a different base or a mistake in the thesis; and the 2026 allocation is identical to that of 2025, which sits oddly with a reported budget cut. The training allocation of Rp5,000,000 for 2026 is the figure that matters most: 249 staff still lack the advanced course, so the sum covers only a handful. In Edwards's terms the resources variable is therefore not fully satisfied. Staff and basic training are present, while budget, vehicles, equipment and advanced skills are short. The thesis's own wording at one point says the resource indicator "has been met" and at another that it is "not optimal"; the second is better supported by its data.

4.3 Disposition

The Head of the Division described staff commitment as good, citing routine evaluations at every platoon change, and the Platoon Commander said staff try to be ready and responsible, motivated by a moral duty to serve the public and not only by their status as officials. Readiness and discipline show in the 24-hour duty: when a member is sick or has an urgent matter, colleagues swap shifts so that no post is left empty. Professionalism is pursued through training, competency tests and field experience, though the training money limits how many staff can take advanced courses. The disposition variable therefore supports implementation, subject again to the fact that it is described by the unit's own officers.

4.4 Bureaucratic structure

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) exist for receiving a report, going to the scene, suppression, rescue and evacuation. The Platoon Commander said they are easy to apply because staff have been trained in them. Tasks are divided so that each person has a place at a fire, and reports are received through WhatsApp and then acted on by the staff on duty. The thesis does not say whether the SOPs are written documents that were reviewed in the study, and it makes no comparison between them and the national standard.

On structure, before the Regulation the fire service was a unit with no sections, so its tasks were general; now the division has two sections with clear duties, and the Head of the Division said coordination between sections is more effective than before. The head of a unit used to send strategic decisions (a new post, repair of a badly damaged engine) through the head of the Unit to the regional secretary or the regent, which was slow; the head of a division sits in the Unit's internal meetings and can decide operational matters and internal budgeting before the Unit head approves them. The structure variable supports implementation, but the thesis offers no before-and-after data (response times, decision times) that would show the change in speed.

4.5 Carrying out the four tasks

Prevention. The division carries out public education and training for neighbourhood units, community protection volunteers, schools, and government and private bodies, showing causes of fire, the use of portable extinguishers and first steps in a fire. The Head of the Division said it holds about two sessions a week at the main office and the WMK posts, with good response, and that schools often visit the office. The 273 prevention activities recorded in 2025 are consistent with this.

Suppression. Reports come mainly by WhatsApp and other channels, and staff prepare and go to the scene under the SOP. The Head of the Division said the average time to reach a fire is about fifteen minutes, which matches the 15-minute target that the thesis gives for the service; the official data show a lower average of 10.13 minutes, but with large differences between districts, the worst at 20 minutes. Problems on the scene are distance from water or hydrants, narrow roads, areas that are hard to reach and traffic that does not give way to fire engines.

Rescue. Rescue covers victims of fires and of traffic accidents, animal rescue (including animals fallen into wells), and trapped people. Staff are trained in basic rescue and take care to avoid worsening injuries before medical help, and tasks are shared according to skill. *Evacuation.* After a report, staff assess the scene, weigh the risk and move victims with care, handing seriously injured people to health workers; all of this is done under the SOP.

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

The author judges that all four tasks are carried out in line with Regulation 25/2025. What the thesis shows is that the tasks are done and that the staff describe them as done under procedure. It does not measure quality (for example how often prevention reaches the villages with the most fires, or how many rescues succeed), and so a finding of "in line with the Regulation" means only that the activities listed in the Regulation are being carried out.

5. Discussion

The study supports the view that an organisational change can improve the working of a public service when it is followed by clear communication and good staff attitudes. Three of Edwards's four variables support implementation, and the fourth, resources, is the limit. This is a common finding in studies of regional services: an institutional upgrade, here from a unit to a division with a higher-grade head and two sections, clarifies the structure but does not by itself bring the money, vehicles and training that the larger task needs.

Three points deserve more attention than the thesis gives them. First, the mismatch between the work and the money. Fires are a small part of what the division does, while evacuation, rescue and prevention are most of it, yet the 2026 savings fell first on the non-fire services, which the Head of the Division said are now done selectively. Regulation 25/2025 makes rescue in other situations that endanger people part of the division's duty. If these tasks are legal duties, then cutting them quietly to save money is a gap between the Regulation and its implementation, even if every procedure is followed. A budget that follows the actual workload, and a clear policy on which non-fire services are provided, would close it.

Second, the standard that the service is measured against. The thesis finds that tasks are done "in accordance with the Regulation", but the more useful tests are the minimum service standards in Regulation 114/2018 and the national direction in Regulation 16/2020. The data it gives suggest that the average response time meets a 15-minute target while several districts are far above it, and that the fleet is short of the ideal by seven engines. These are the figures an evaluation of the Regulation should report district by district. Third, the national requirement of a separate fire agency, which the thesis mentions only in passing, bears directly on the question whether combining fire and civil service police in one body, even with a division, is a stable arrangement. The Regulation implements a regional decision that keeps them together, and the study does not test that choice.

The study confirms earlier work on the previous regulation, which found that the service ran but was held back by staff, equipment and geography, and it adds that the new structure has not removed those limits.[7] It differs from studies of service quality in cities such as Surabaya and Makassar in that it asks whether a legal instrument is carried out and not how users rate the service.

6. Conclusion

Regent Regulation 25/2025 has, on the evidence of this study, been implemented in the fire service of Magelang Regency. The change from a technical unit to a division clarified the position of the organisation, the division of duties and the powers of its units. By Edwards's four variables, communication, disposition and bureaucratic structure support implementation, while resources do not yet: a budget efficiency measure applied in 2026, the fleet is below the ideal, protective equipment is short and few staff have advanced training. The four tasks of prevention, suppression, rescue and evacuation are carried out in line with the

[7]Septiantoro and others (2024); Khamami (2023).

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW

Regulation as the unit describes them. Supporting factors are effective communication, staff commitment, a clearer structure and SOPs; hindering factors are limited budget, equipment, uneven skills and conditions in the field such as distance from water, narrow roads and traffic.

Several recommendations follow. The regency government should provide a budget that matches the workload, including for vehicles, equipment, protective clothing and non-fire rescue. The Unit should extend training and certification to all staff and review SOPs and coordination regularly. The public should join prevention activities and give way to fire engines. The findings rest on two interviews and the unit's own data, so further research should add the views of other agencies and the public, measure response times and outcomes district by district against the minimum service standards, and compare several regions.

References

Edwards GC III, *Implementing Public Policy* (Congressional Quarterly Press 1980), as cited in the thesis.

Government Regulation No 18 of 2016 on Regional Bodies.

Hermansyah, Ismail and Lina SR, 'Penerapan Otonomi Daerah Pada Sektor Pelayanan dan Prinsip Good Governance (Studi Pada Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu Di Kota Bekasi)' (2023) 6(1) 106.

Hia FP, Suherman A and Firdiyani F, 'Responsivitas Pelayanan Pemadam Kebakaran Unit Pelaksana Teknis di Kecamatan Batuceper Kota Tangerang' (2025) 12(2) 561.

Khamami T, 'Implementasi Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Kualifikasi Aparatur Pemadam Kebakaran Di Daerah (Studi Pada Unit Pelaksana Teknis Penanggulangan Kebakaran Kabupaten Magelang)' (undergraduate thesis, Universitas Muhammadiyah Magelang 2023).

Law No 23 of 2014 on Regional Government.

Law No 25 of 2009 on Public Services.

Law No 30 of 2014 on Government Administration.

Magelang Regency Regulation No 6 of 2024 on the Second Amendment to Regency Regulation No 19 of 2016 on the Establishment and Structure of Regional Bodies.

Magelang Regent Regulation No 25 of 2025 on the Position, Organisational Structure, Duties and Functions, and Working Procedures of the Civil Service Police and Fire Protection Unit.

Magelang Regent Regulation No 60 of 2021 (repealed).

Miles MB, Huberman AM and Saldaña J, *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook* (3rd edn, Sage 2014).

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 114 of 2018 on Technical Standards of Basic Services in the Minimum Service Standards for the Fire Sub-Affair.

Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No 16 of 2020.

Septiantoro G and others, 'Implementasi Peraturan Bupati Magelang Nomor 60 Tahun 2021 tentang Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja dan Penanggulangan Kebakaran' (2024).

Soekanto S and Mamudji S, *Penelitian Hukum Normatif: Suatu Tinjauan Singkat* (2015).

MANUSCRIPT IN REVIEW